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Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) protocols based on coherent detection
have been studied extensively in both theory and experiment. In all the existing implementations of
CV-QKD, both the quantum signal and the local oscillator (LO) are generated from the same laser
and propagate through the insecure quantum channel. This arrangement may open security loop-
holes and limit the potential applications of CV-QKD. In this paper, we propose and demonstrate a
pilot-aided feedforward data recovery scheme which enables reliable coherent detection using a “lo-
cally” generated LO. Using two independent commercial laser sources and a spool of 25 km optical
fiber, we construct a coherent communication system. The variance of the phase noise introduced
by the proposed scheme is measured to be 0.04 (rad2), which is small enough to enable secure key
distribution. This technology also opens the door for other quantum communication protocols, such
as the recently proposed measurement-device-independent (MDI) CV-QKD where independent light
sources are employed by different users.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two authen-
ticated parties, normally referred to as Alice and Bob, to
generate a secure key through an insecure quantum chan-
nel controlled by an eavesdropper, Eve [1–5]. Based on
fundamental laws in quantum mechanics, idealized QKD
protocols have been proved to be unconditionally secure
against adversaries with unlimited computing power and
technological capabilities [6–8].
Both discrete-variable (DV) QKD protocols based on
single photon detection [1, 2] and continuous-variable
(CV) QKD protocols based on coherent detection [9–
11] have been demonstrated as viable solutions in prac-
tice. One well-known CV-QKD protocol is the Gaussian-
modulated coherent state (GMCS) protocol [11], which
has been demonstrated through an 80km optical fiber
link recently [12]. One important advantage of the
GMCS QKD is its robustness against incoherent back-
ground noise. The strong local oscillator (LO) employed
in coherent detection also acts as a natural and extremely
selective filter, which can suppress noise photons effec-
tively. This intrinsic filtering function makes CV-QKD
an appealing solution for secure key distribution over a
noisy channel, such as a lit fiber in a conventional fiber
optic network [13–15] or a free-space optical link [16].
However, all existing implementations of CV-QKD
based on coherent detection contain a serious weakness:
to reduce the phase noise, both the signal and the LO
∗ qib1@ornl.gov
are generated from the same laser and propagate through
the insecure quantum channel [11, 12, 16, 17] 1. This ar-
rangement has several limitations. First of all, it allows
Eve to access both the quantum signal and the LO. Eve
may launch sophisticated attacks by manipulating the
LO, as demonstrated in recent studies [18–21]. Second,
sending a strong LO through a lossy channel can drasti-
cally reduce the efficiency of QKD in certain applications.
For example, to achieve a shot-noise limited coherent de-
tection, the required photon number in the LO is typi-
cally above 108 photons per pulse at the receiver’s end
[11, 12, 17]. With a 1 GHz pulse repetition rate and a
channel loss of 20 dB, the required LO power at the input
of the quantum channel is about 1.2 W (at 1550 nm). If
optical fiber is used as the quantum channel, noise pho-
tons generated by the strong LO inside the optical fiber
may significantly reduce QKD efficiency and multiplex-
ing capacity. Third, the LO is typically 7 or 8 orders
of magnitude brighter than the quantum signal, compli-
cated multiplexing and demultiplexing schemes are re-
quired to effectively separate the LO from the quantum
signal at the receiver’s end 2.
In brief, in CV-QKD, it is desirable to generate the
1 Note in [16], continuous polarization states (that contain the
signal encoding as well as a LO in the same spatial mode) are
prepared and sent over a free-space link in a polarization mul-
tiplexed setting. Such a configuration can automatically offer a
high interferometric visibility.
2 Note, the second and third problems discussed above might be
solved by sending a weak LO from Alice and applying optical
amplification at Bob’s side.
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2LO “locally” using an independent laser source at the
receiver’s end. Unfortunately, such a scheme has never
been implemented in practice. The main challenge is how
to effectively establish a reliable phase reference between
Alice and Bob. While various techniques, such as feedfor-
ward carrier recovery [22], optical phase-locked loops [23],
and optical injection phase-lock loop [24], have been de-
veloped in classical coherent communication, these tech-
niques are not suitable in QKD where the quantum signal
is extremely weak and the tolerable phase noise is low.
Furthermore, to prevent Eve from manipulating the LO,
the LO laser should be isolated from outside both opti-
cally and electrically.
In this paper, we solve the above long outstanding
problem by proposing and demonstrating a pilot-aided
feedforward data recovery scheme, which enables reli-
able coherent detection using a “locally” generated LO.
This scheme is built upon the observation that in the
GMCS QKD, Bob does not need to perform the mea-
surement in the “correct basis”. In fact, Bob can per-
form the measurement in an arbitrarily rotated basis as
along as the basis information (the phase reference) is
available afterwards. With this post-measurement ba-
sis information, either Alice or Bob can rotate data at
hand and generate correlated data with the other. We
demonstrate the above scheme in a coherent communi-
cation system constructed by a spool of 25 km optical
fiber and two independent commercial laser sources op-
erated at free-running mode. The observed phase-noise
variance is 0.04 (rad2), which is small enough to enable
secure key distribution. This technology also opens the
door for other novel quantum communication protocols,
such as the measurement-device-independent (MDI) CV-
QKD protocol [25–27] where independent light sources
are employed by different users.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we
conduct a theoretical analysis of the proposed scheme.
In Section III, we present the details of proof-of-principle
experiments. We conclude this paper with a discussion
in Section IV.
II. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In GMCS QKD, Alice draws two random numbers XA
and PA from a set of Gaussian random numbers (with a
mean of zero and a variance of VAN0), prepares a coher-
ent state |XA + iPA〉 accordingly, and sends it to Bob.
Here N0 = 1/4 denotes the shot-noise variance. At Bob’s
end, he can perform either optical homodyne detection
or optical heterodyne detection.
In GMCS QKD protocol based on homodyne detection
[11], Bob randomly chooses to measure either the am-
plitude quadrature (X) or phase quadrature (P) of the
incoming signal. Later on, he announces which quadra-
ture he measures for each incoming signal through an
authenticated public channel, and Alice only keeps the
corresponding data. In GMCS QKD based on hetero-
dyne detection [28], Bob first splits the incoming signal
into two with a 50:50 beam splitter. He then measures
X at one output port and P at the other. In this case,
Alice keeps all her quadrature data.
After the quantum transmission stage, Alice shares
a set of correlated Gaussian random variables (called
the“raw key”) with Bob. Alice and Bob compare a ran-
dom sample of the raw key through an authenticated
classical channel to estimate the transmittance and ex-
cess noise of the quantum channel. If the observed excess
noise is small enough, they can further work out a secure
key.
In the above description, we have implicitly assumed
that Alice and Bob share a phase reference, so Bob can
perform the required quadrature measurement. If the
LO is generated for an independent laser source, how can
Alice and Bob establish a phase reference in this case?
In this section, we present a pilot-aided phase esti-
mation scheme which allows Alice and Bob to measure
the phase relation between two independent lasers in real
time. Using this phase information either Alice or Bob
can rotate the data at hand in the post-processing stage
(“quadrature remapping”) and establish correlation with
the other. In principle, our scheme can be applied to both
CV-QKD with homodyne detection and the one with het-
erodyne detection. In this paper, we focus on the case
of heterodyne detection. For an independent and related
work, see [29].
A. CV-QKD using quadrature remapping scheme
In a phase coding DV-QKD protocol, it is also crucial
to control the phase between a signal pulse and a ref-
erence pulse when performing interferometric measure-
ment. In fact, a DV-QKD protocol using a strong phase-
reference pulse has been proposed in [30]. In this scheme,
Alice sends Bob a quantum signal together with a strong
phase reference pulse generated from the same laser. At
Bob’s side, he interferes the strong phase reference pulse
with a sampling beam from his LO laser to determine
the phase difference between the two lasers, corrects this
phase difference by introducing a phase shift to his LO
laser, and then performs an interfeometric measurement
on the quantum signal using the phase-corrected LO
pulse. However, the above scheme has not been demon-
strated yet, possibly due to the following reasons: first,
the phase difference between two remote independent
lasers is expected to fluctuate rapidly, this makes real-
time phase feedback control very challenging. Secondly,
different types of detector are required for phase mea-
surement and quantum signal detection, this increases
the complexity of the overall system. As we will show
below, the above two challenges can be overcome in a
CV-QKD protocol.
Suppose in a CV-QKD system based on heterodyne
detection, both the signal laser and the LO laser are op-
erated in free-running mode. Without loss of generality,
3for each transmission, we can choose the phase of the
signal laser as the phase reference (φS = 0). When Bob
performs conjugated homodyne detection, the phase φ of
his LO laser can be treated as a random variable. Bob’s
measurement results (XB , PB) are given by (after scaling
with the channel transmittance)
XB = XAcosφ+ PAsinφ+NX
PB = −XAsinφ+ PAcosφ+NP (1)
where NX and NP are assumed to be i.i.d. Gaussian
noises with zero mean.
If Alice and Bob can determine φ after Bob has per-
formed his measurement, one of them (for example, Bob)
can use this post-measurement phase information to cor-
rect his data by performing the following rotation
X
′
B = XBcosφ− PBsinφ
P
′
B = XBsinφ+ PBcosφ (2)
From equations (1) and (2), it is easy to show
X
′
B = XA +N
′
X
P
′
B = PA +N
′
P (3)
where the noise terms in the rotated data are given by
N
′
X = NXcosφ−NP sinφ
N
′
P = NXsinφ+NP cosφ (4)
Given NX and NP are i.i.d. Gaussian noises, it is easy
to see that N
′
X and N
′
P are also independent Gaussian
noises with the same variance as NX and NP . This sug-
gests that the rotation process will not introduce addi-
tional noise if the phase φ can be determined precisely.
The above “quadrature remapping” scheme allows Al-
ice and Bob to establish correlated data without using
a complicated phase feedback control system, thus re-
moving the first challenge listed at the beginning of this
section. Next, we will present a scheme which allows
Alice and Bob to determine φ under realistic scenarios
using the same detector for quantum signal detection,
thus removing the second challenge listed above.
B. Pilot-aided phase recovery scheme
If the drift of phase φ is slow enough such that within
a frame time of ∆T (within which the phase φ can be
treated as a constant), many rounds of quantum trans-
mission can be conducted, the following scheme can be
applied to estimate the phase φ. After the quantum
transmission stage, for each frame, Alice can randomly
choose a subset of the transmitted signals as calibration
pulses and announce the encoded data through an au-
thenticated channel. Using the corresponding measure-
ment results at hand, Bob can estimate phase φ for this
frame using equation (1). Since Alice’s signals are at
quantum level, each individual calibration pulse cannot
provide a precise estimation of the phase φ. However,
by averaging the results acquired from a large number of
calibration pulses, the phase noise can be reduced effec-
tively. This scheme was first proposed and implemented
in [17] to reduce the noise associated with the slow phase
drift of a fiber interferometer in GMCS QKD.
Unfortunately, the above scheme is not practical when
the quantum signals and the LOs are generated from in-
dependent laser sources. On one hand, the phase dif-
ference between two practical lasers fluctuates rapidly
due to the laser frequency instability and the phase noise
associated with the finite laser linewidth; on the other
hand, the maximum transmission rate of CV-QKD is
limited by the bandwidth of shot-noise limited optical
coherent detector. As such, we cannot acquire an accu-
rate estimation of φ by measuring quantum signals.
To solve the above problem, we proposed a pilot-aided
feedforward data recovery scheme [31]. The basic idea is
as follows. For each quantum transmission, Alice sends
out both a quantum signal and a relatively strong phase
reference pulse generated from the same laser. The quan-
tum signal carries Alice’s random numbers, as in the case
of conventional CV-QKD. The reference pulse, on the
other hand, is not modulated. These two pulses propa-
gate through the same quantum channel to the measure-
ment device, where Bob performs conjugate homodyne
detection on both of them using LOs generated from the
LO laser. Note, to avoid detector saturation, Bob can
use a relatively weak LO to measure the reference pulse.
The measurement results from the phase reference
pulse (XR, PR) can be used to determine φ using
φ = −tan−1 PR
XR
(5)
where the minus sign is due to the definition of phase
reference. By using a relatively strong reference pulse,
Bob can acquire an accurate estimation of φ and use this
phase information to implement the quadrature remap-
ping scheme.
In this paper, we study a simple implementation of
the above scheme, where Alice sends out quantum sig-
nals and reference pulses alternately and periodically, as
shown in Figure 1. We remark that if the drift of phase
φ is slow enough compared with the transmission rate
of QKD, it is possible to use fewer reference pulses to
improve QKD efficiency.
In Fig.1, a quantum signal Si and the corresponding
reference pulse Ri are measured at different times with
a time delay of Td. If the frequency difference of the
two lasers (f1 − f2) is a constant and can be precisely
determined, we can estimate phase φS,i at the time when
Si is measured from the phase measurement result of Ri
by simply adding a constant phase shift of 2pi(f1−f2)Td.
In practice, however, both lasers present slow frequency
drift over time. Here, we use a simple scheme to estimate
φS,i. Since the signal pulse Si is in the middle of two
reference pulses Ri and Ri+1, we can estimate φS,i from
4Td Td
Ri Ri+1Si
Td
Si+1
time
FIG. 1: Distribution of quantum signals (S) and
reference pulses (R).
the phase measurement results on Ri and Ri+1 as
φS,i =
φR,i + φR,i+1
2
(6)
Note the above equation can also be written as
φS,i = φR,i + 2pifdTd (7)
where fd =
φR,i+1 − φR,i
4piTd
can be interpreted as the fre-
quency difference of the two lasers within the short time
interval between two adjacent reference pulses.
While similar to classical intradyne detection, a key
difference in our scheme separates phase recovery of a
quantum signal from that of a classical one. A phase
reference cannot be recovered reliably from a quantum
signal while it can in the classical case, meaning that the
reference pulses here must be used to estimate that phase
of the LO and quantum signal during the time window in
which the quantum signal arrives. This places additional
stringent requirements on relative laser noise compared
to the classical case.
C. Security analysis
In this section, we will show that the existing secu-
rity proofs of conventional CV-QKD [32–34] (built upon
the assumption that Eve can only access the quantum
signals) can be applied in our scheme directly.
First, the phase reference pulses are only used to pro-
vide (classical) phase information, they are not directly
used in the coherent detection of the quantum signals.
In fact, in our scheme Eve can never access the LO it-
self. Note, a standard assumption in CV-QKD is that
Eve can have full knowledge of the phase reference used
in quantum state preparation/coherent detection, so the
reference pulses will not give Eve any additional informa-
tion. Eve can certainly interfere with the phase recovery
process by manipulating the phase reference pulses when
they propagate through the quantum channel. This could
result in an increased phase noise and the secure key rate
will be reduced. This is one type of denial-of-service at-
tack, which can be applied to any QKD protocols. From
Eve’s point of view, whatever can be achieved by manip-
ulating the reference pulses can also be achieved by ma-
nipulating the quantum signals directly. In brief, sending
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FIG. 2: Security models. HD–heterodyne detection. (a)
CV-QKD protocol using quadrature remapping scheme;
(b) A virtual QKD scheme equivalents to (a); (c)
Conventional QKD scheme.
phase reference pulses through the quantum channel will
not cause any security problem.
Next, we will show the security of the CV-QKD pro-
tocol using quadrature remapping scheme is equivalent
to that of the conventional CV-QKD protocol. To illus-
trate the essential ideas, it is convenient to represent the
phase recovery scheme by a separate classical commu-
nication channel, which can be fully controlled by Eve.
Fig.2 (a) is a schematic diagram of Bob’s system in our
new QKD scheme. In this picture, Bob performs a het-
erodyne measurement on the incoming quantum signal,
then rotates his measurement results using the phase φ
estimated through the classical communication channel.
In [35], the authors proved that a unitary phase rotation
commutes with heterodyne detection. More specifically,
Bob can either rotate the optical phase of the quantum
signal first, then perform heterodyne detection, or he can
perform heterodyne detection first, then rotate the classi-
cal measurement results in the post-processing stage. So
the protocol shown in Fig.2 (a) is equivalent to the vir-
tual QKD protocol shown in Fig.2 (b). Since the classical
phase estimation channel can be controlled by Eve, we
can move the phase rotation operator out of Bob’s secure
station and let Eve to have full control of it, as shown in
Fig.2 (c). Note the QKD protocol shown in Fig.2 (c) is
exactly the conventional CV-QKD based on heterodyne
detection, where Eve is allowed to manipulate the quan-
tum signals transmitted through the channel at her will.
So, the security of our new QKD scheme is equivalent to
that of the conventional CV-QKD protocol.
While we do not need to develop a new security proof
5for the proposed QKD scheme, to achieve a high secure
key rate, it is important to reduce the noise of the phase
recovery process. From Eq. (2), the uncertainty of φ
will be translated into an excess noise in (X
′
B , P
′
B) (after
scaling with the channel transmittance) as
εφ = VAσφ (8)
where VA is Alice’s modulation variance, σφ is the noise
variance in determining phase φ. This extra noise εφ
will reduce secure key generation rate. It is thus very
important to minimize the phase noise σφ.
In next section, we will study the performance of the
proposed phase recovery scheme under realistic scenario.
III. PROOF OF PRINCIPLE DEMONSTRATION
A. Noise model
There are two major noise sources in determining
phase φ using Eq.(6). The first one is the measurement
noise when Bob tries to determine φR,i (φR,i+1) of the ref-
erence pulses Ri (Ri+1). This noise could be significant
when the reference pulses become extremely weak thus
the contribution of shot noise cannot be ignored. How-
ever, in practice, we can use a relative strong reference
pulse to reduce the contribution of the shot noise. For
example, if the average photon number of the reference
pulse (at Bob’s heterodyne detector) is 1000, given the
detection efficiency of the heterordyne detector is 50%,
the phase noise variance due to the shot noise is about
0.001, which is negligible in practice. In this paper, we
simply ignore this noise contribution.
The second noise source is the quantum phase noise
of the laser, which originates from the amplified spon-
taneous emission. More specifically, even we know the
phase of the reference pulse, we still cannot determine
the phase of the signal pulse precisely since they are gen-
erated at different times. The spontaneous emitted pho-
tons generated within the above time interval contribute
a fundamental phase noise. Since the laser phase noise
cannot be reduced by simply increasing the amplitude
of the reference pulse, it is the main noise source in our
scheme.
Define the laser phase at time t = 0 as θ0. The phase
noise ∆θ(t) quantifies the deviation of the laser phase at
time t from θ0 + 2pift (the phase expected from an ideal
sine wave), where f is the central frequency of the laser.
∆θ(t) can be modeled as a Gaussian random variable
with a mean of zero and a variance of [36]
〈(∆θ(t))2〉 = 2t
τc
. (9)
Here τc is the coherence time of the laser. For a laser
with lorentzian lineshape, τc is related to its linewidth
∆f by [36]
τc ' 1
pi∆f
. (10)
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FIG. 3: Experimental setup. S-signal laser; L-LO laser;
IM-optical intensity modulator; PM-optical phase
modulator; AWG-arbitrary waveform generator;
SMF-25km single mode fiber spool; PC- polarization
controller; BD-balanced photodetector;
OSC-oscilloscope.
As shown in Appendix A, given the phase noise of the
signal laser and that of the LO laser are 〈(∆θS(t))2〉 and
〈(∆θL(t))2〉 respectively, the noise variance of our phase
estimation scheme (Eq.(6)) is described by
σφ =
1
2
{〈(∆θS(Td))2〉+ 〈(∆θL(Td))2〉} , (11)
where Td is the time delay between the signal pulse and
the reference pulse (see Fig.1).
B. Experimental setup
We demonstrate the pilot-aided feedforward data re-
covery scheme using commercial off-the-shelf devices.
The experimental setup is shown in Fig.3. Two commer-
cial frequency-stabilized continuous wave (cw) lasers at
Telecom wavelength (Clarity-NLL-1542-HP from Wave-
length Reference) are employed as the signal and the LO
laser. Both lasers are operated at free-running mode with
no optical or electrical connections between them. The
central frequency difference between the two lasers can
stay within 10 MHz without doing any feedback controls.
A LiNbO3 waveguide intensity modulator (EOSpace) is
used to generate 8 ns laser pulses at a repetition rate of
50 MHz. Since half of the laser pulses are used as phase
references, the equivalent data transmission rate in our
experiment is 25 MHz. A LiNbO3 waveguide phase mod-
ulator (EOSpace) is used to modulate the phase of the
signal pulses.
Both the signal pulses and the reference pulses propa-
gate through a spool of 25km single mode fiber before ar-
riving at the measurement device. A commercial 90o op-
tical hybrid (Optoplex) and two 350 MHz balanced am-
plified photodetectors (Thorlabs) are employed to mea-
sure both X-quadrature and P-quadrature of the incom-
ing pulses. The 90o optical hybrid is a passive device
featuring a compact design. No temperature control is
required to stabilize its internal interferometers. The out-
puts of the two balanced photodetectors are sampled by
a broadband oscilloscope at 1 GHz sampling rate. For
simplicity, the LO laser is operated at the cw mode. A
6waveform generator with a bandwidth of 120 MHz pro-
vides the modulation signals to both the intensity and
the phase modulator, and a synchronization signal to the
oscilloscope.
C. Experimental results
To evaluate the effectiveness of the phase recov-
ery scheme, we conduct a phase encoding coherent
communication experiment using a binary pattern of
“01010101...”, where bit 0 is represented by no phase
shift and bit 1 by phase shift of 1.65rad. The phase
modulator shown in Fig.3 is used to encode binary phase
information on the signal pulses. The amplitude of the
signal pulse is the same as that of the reference pulse. At
the receiver’s end, the average photon number per pulse
is about 105, which is significantly lower than that of the
LO used in a typical GMCS QKD experiment. Note,
in this experiment, to determine the noise of the phase
recovery scheme, strong signal pulses are employed to
provide “true” values of the phases to be estimated.
In total, 25000 signal pulses and 25000 reference pulses
are transmitted. For each pulse received by Bob, its
phase is calculated from the measured quadrature val-
ues {X,P} using Eq.(5). The phase measurement re-
sults from the signal pulses
{
φ
(raw)
S,i , i = 1, 2, ...25000
}
are shown in Fig.4(a) and (b). Due to the random phase
change between the signal laser and the LO laser, the
measured phases are randomly distributed within [0, 2pi),
regardless the encoded phase information.
From the phase measurement results of the reference
pulses {φR,i, i = 1, 2, ...25000}, we recover a phase refer-
ence φS,i for each signal pulse using Eq.(6), and correct
the raw measurement results by
φ
(cor)
S,i = φ
(raw)
S,i + φS,i (12)
The corrected phase measurement results{
φ
(cor)
S,i , i = 1, 2, ...25000
}
are shown in Fig.4(c) and
(d). After the phase correction, the measurement results
for bit 0 and bit 1 are clearly separated.
The variances of the residual phase noise (the differ-
ence between φ
(cor)
S,i and the phase information encoded
by Alice) have been determined to be 0.040± 0.001 (for
bit 0) and 0.039± 0.001 (for bit 1) respectively.
Note in the above experiment, relatively strong refer-
ence pulses have been employed. While this will not in-
troduce any security problem, in practice, it may be more
convenient to use weak reference pulses. We conduct ex-
periments to determine phase noise variance σφ using
reference pulses with different average photon numbers
(10000, 1000, 100). The measured phase noise variance
are (0.039 ± 0.001, 0.040 ± 0.001, 0.054 ± 0.001). These
results show that the phase recovery scheme works well
even with reference pulses containing only a thousand
photons.
FIG. 4: Histograms of the phase measurement results.
(a) The measurement results corresponding to bit 0
(before phase correction); (b) The measurement results
corresponding to bit 1 (before phase correction); (c)
The measurement results corresponding to bit 0 (after
phase correction); (d) The measurement results
corresponding to bit 1 (after phase correction).
As we have discussed in the previous section, the main
noise source in our setup is laser phase noise associated
with its finite linewidth. We conduct experiments to de-
termine the phase noise of each laser. For Td = 20ns
(which corresponds to the 50MHz pulse repetition rate in
the above experiments), the phase noise of the two lasers
has been determined to be 0.035±0.001 and 0.044±0.001,
see details in Appendix A. From Eq.(11), the expected
noise of the phase recovery scheme is σφ = 0.040±0.001,
which matches with the experimental results very well.
To further reduce the noise σφ, we can either use a smaller
time delay Td (which is ultimately limited by detector
bandwidth), or choose lasers with a narrower linewidth.
As another demonstration of the phase recovery
scheme, we conduct an experiment by using the phase
reference recovered from the reference pulses to remap
quadrature values measured with weak quantum signals.
In this experiment, no phase information is encoded on
the signal pulses. The average photon number of each
reference pulse at the receiver’s end is about 1000, while
that of each signal pulse is 66. Fig.5 shows the quadrature
values (X,P ) of the signal pulses in phase-space (sample
size is 24000). The figure on the left shows the raw mea-
surement results, where the phase randomly distributed
in [0, 2pi) as expected. The figure on the right shows
the results after performing quadrature remapping. More
specifically, we first recover a phase reference φS,i for each
signal pulse using Eq.(6), and then rotate the raw data
using Eq.(2). The quadrature values have been scaled
by taking into account the 3-dB loss due to heterodyne
detection and the 50% overall efficiency of the detection
system. The noise variance in the X-quadrature (right
7FIG. 5: The measured quadrature values in phase
space. Left–before quadrature remapping; Right–after
quadrature remapping.
figure) has been determined to be 1.83 in shot noise units.
This suggests the excess noise of the detector (includ-
ing noise from the commercial balanced photo-detector
and the oscilloscope) is about 0.83 in shot-noise units.
Note, due to the residual phase noise of the phase re-
covery scheme, the distribution shown in the right fig-
ure is not symmetric: the variance of P-quadrature (∆P )
is larger than that of X-quadrature (∆X). The phase
noise σφ in the above experiment can be estimated by
σφ = (∆P − ∆X)/X20 , where X0 is the mean value of
X-quadrature. The experimental result is (0.034± 0.01),
which is consistent with the noise variance estimated with
strong signal pulses. This shows the proposed phase re-
covery scheme works well in both the classical and the
quantum domain. Note the uncertainty in this measure-
ment is higher than that in previous experiments, since
we estimate a small quantity (σφ) from the difference of
two relatively large quantities (∆P and ∆X).
Given the noise of the phase recovery scheme, we can
use Eq.(8) to determine the additional excess noise con-
tributed by this scheme and estimate the secure key rate
using existing security proof of GMCS QKD. In appendix
B, we present simulation results based on practical sys-
tem parameters. Under the “realistic” model [11] where
Eve cannot control the noise and loss of Bob’s detector,
secure key can be generated over a distance of 120km
through telecom fiber. To estimate the finite data size
effect, we also conduct simulations using the most recent
composable security proof of CV-QKD [34].
IV. DISCUSSION
A long outstanding problem in CV QKD based on co-
herent detection is how to generate the LO “locally”. In
all the existing implementations of CV-QKD, both the
quantum signal and the LO are generated from the same
laser and propagate through the insecure quantum chan-
nel. This arrangement may open security loopholes and
also limit the potential applications of CV-QKD.
In this paper, we solve the above problem by propos-
ing and demonstrating a pilot-aided feedforward data re-
covery scheme which allows reliable coherent detection
using a “locally” generated LO. This scheme also greatly
simplifies the CV-QKD design by getting rid of the cum-
bersome unbalanced fiber interferometers and the asso-
ciated phase stabilization system. Proof of principle ex-
periments based on commercial off-the-shelf components
show that the noise due to the proposed scheme is tol-
erable in CV-QKD. To further reduce the noise, laser
sources with a smaller linewidth can be applied.
We remark that the measurement device employed
in our experiment is essentially an intradyne detection
scheme which has been applied in classical coherent com-
munication for carrier phase recovery [37, 38]. It is thus
convenient to name our new scheme as “intradyne” CV-
QKD while the conventional scheme as “self-homodyne”
CV-QKD [39]. However, there are several important
differences between the classical and the quantum case.
First, in classical communication, the signals are strong
and the modulation scheme (such as BPSK and QPSK)
is relatively simple. This allows carrier phase recovery
from the signals directly. In GMCS QKD, the quantum
signals are extremely weak and the modulation scheme
is more complicated, the carrier phase cannot be recov-
ered from the quantum signals reliably. Thus it is neces-
sary to employ relatively strong reference pulses. Second,
the transmission rate of a classical communication sys-
tem can reach 100GHz, while the transmission rate of a
state-of-the-art GMCS QKD system is below 100MHz.
This places a more stringent requirement on laser phase
noise in the quantum system. Third, a classical digital
communication system can tolerate higher phase noise
than the CV-QKD. In brief, it is much more challenging
to recover carrier phase in quantum communication.
Although a complete CV-QKD experiment using the
proposed scheme is not presented in this paper, all the
components required to implement such a system, in-
cluding broadband shot-noise limited homodyne detec-
tors [40–42], have been well developed. In fact, the struc-
ture of the proposed QKD system is much simpler com-
pared to the conventional scheme [12].
We remark that a similar CV-QKD scheme has been
independently proposed by Soh et al. [29]. In [29], Soh et
al. study the expected secure key rate of their protocol
under a passive channel taking into account the effects
of quantum noise on the reference pulse, and show in
what limit the reference pulse scheme achieves the same
performance as the standard scheme (where an LO is
transmitted). They further conduct a proof-of-principle
QKD experiment in the presence of strong phase noise
between Alice’s signal pulses and Bob’s LO pulses gener-
ated from the same laser. In our study, we establish the
security of the proposed QKD protocol by showing that
it is equivalent to the conventional GMCS QKD proto-
col, thus the well-established security proof can be ap-
plied directly. Our proof-of-principle demonstration fo-
cuses on establishing a reliable phase reference between
two independent lasers over a 25km optical fiber link, a
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FIG. 6: Phase noise analysis.
practical scenario that the proposed protocol is designed
for. We expect our scheme will be widely adopted in
CV-QKD. This technology also opens the door for other
quantum communication protocols, such as the MDI-CV-
QKD protocol.
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Appendix A: Laser phase noise
In this Appendix, we will first derive Eq.(11), which
quantifies the contribution of laser phase noise to the
noise variance of the phase recovery scheme. Then we
will present details of experiments where the phase noise
of each laser is measured.
For simplicity, we consider the case that the phases of
two reference pulses measured at time t0 and t2 are used
to estimate the phase difference of the signal laser and
the LO laser at time t1, as shown in Fig.6.
Assume that the phases of the signal laser and the LO
laser at time {t0, t1, t2} are {α0, α1, α2;β0, β1, β2} corre-
spondingly. The phase difference of the two lasers at the
above times are given by
φ0 = β0 − α0
φ1 = β1 − α1
φ2 = β2 − α2. (A1)
The phases of the signal laser at different times are
related by
α1 = α0 + 2pifSTd +NS,1
α2 = α1 + 2pifSTd +NS,2, (A2)
where fS is the central frequency of the signal laser. NS,1
and NS,2 are independent Gaussian noises with a mean
of zero and a variance of 〈(∆θS(Td))2〉.
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FIG. 7: Experimental setup for determining laser phase
noise. L-laser; BS-fiber beam splitter; PC-polarization
controller; BD-balanced photodetector;
OSC-oscilloscope.
Similarly, the phases of the LO laser are related by
β1 = β0 + 2pifLTd +NL,1
β2 = β1 + 2pifLTd +NL,2, (A3)
where fL is the central frequency of the LO laser. NL,1
and NL,2 are independent Gaussian noises with a mean
of zero and a variance of 〈(∆θL(Td))2〉.
We assume that φ0 and φ2 can be determined precisely
by using strong reference pulses. From Eq.(6) and using
Eqs.(A1-A3), phase φ1 can be estimated by
φ1 =
φ0 + φ2
2
= φ1 +
NS,1 +NL,2 −NS,2 −NL,1
2
. (A4)
Since all the above noise terms in Eq. (A4) are in-
dependent with each other, it is easy to show the noise
variance of the phase recovery scheme is given by
σφ1 = 〈(φ1 − φ1)2〉
=
1
2
{〈(∆θS(Td))2〉+ 〈(∆θL(Td))2〉} . (A5)
This is Eq.(11) in the main text.
We conduct experiments to determine the laser phase
noise 〈(∆θS(Td))2〉 and 〈(∆θL(Td))2〉. The experimental
setup is shown in Fig.7. The cw output of a laser is split
into two beams by a symmetric fiber splitter. After the
the two beams passing through two separate fiber links,
the phase difference between the two beams are measured
with a 90o optical hybrid, two balanced photodetectors,
and an oscilloscope.
Given the time delay difference between the two fiber
links is Td, we can determine the phase noise 〈(∆θ(Td))2〉
of each laser directly. The phase noise of both the signal
laser and the LO laser are measured at time delay Td =
(5ns, 20ns, 25ns). The experimental results are shown
in Fig.8. As expected from Eq.(9), the observed laser
phase noise linearly depends on Td. At Td = 20ns, the
phase noise of the two laser has been determined to be
0.035± 0.001 and 0.044± 0.001.
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Appendix B: Simulation of secure key rate
The security of one-way GMCS QKD has been well
established. Here, our simulations are based on secure
key rate formulas given in [43].
The secure key rate under the optimal collective attack,
in the case of reverse reconciliation, is given by
R = fIAB − χBE (B1)
where IAB is the Shannon mutual information shared
between Alice and Bob; f is the efficiency of the rec-
onciliation algorithm; χBE is the Holevo bound of the
information between Eve and Bob.
The mutual information between Alice and Bob is
given by
IAB = log2
V + χtot
1 + χtot
(B2)
The Holevo bound of the information between Eve and
Bob is given by
χBE =
2∑
i=1
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
−
5∑
i=3
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
(B3)
where G(x) = (x+ 1)log2(x+ 1)− xlog2x
λ21,2 =
1
2
[
A±
√
A2 − 4B
]
(B4)
where
A = V 2(1− 2T ) + 2T + T 2(V + χline)2 (B5)
B = T 2(V χline + 1)
2 (B6)
λ23,4 =
1
2
[
C ±
√
C2 − 4D
]
(B7)
FIG. 9: Simulation results based on realistic
parameters.
where
C =
1
(T (V + χtot))2
[Aχ2het +B + 1 + 2χhet
(V
√
B + T (V + χline)) + 2T (V
2 − 1)]
(B8)
D =
(
V +
√
Bχhet
T (V + χtot)
)2
(B9)
λ5 = 1 (B10)
System parameters in the above equations are defined
as follows.
(a) V = VA + 1, where VA is Alice’s modulation vari-
ance.
(b) The total noise referred to the channel input χtot =
χline+
χhet
T
, where T is the channel transmittance.
If we assume the quantum channel between Alice
and Bob is optical fiber with an attenuation coeffi-
cient of α, then the channel transmittance is given
by T = 10
−αL
10 , where L is the fiber length.
(c) The total channel-added noise referred to the chan-
nel input χline =
1
T − 1 + ε, where ε is the excess
noise outside of Bob’s system. We assume that ε is
mainly due to imperfection of the LO phase recov-
ery scheme
ε = VAσφ (B11)
where σφ is the noise variance associated with the
LO phase recovery scheme.
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FIG. 10: Secure key rate simulation results for a finite
number of pulses.
(d) The detection-added noise referred to Bob’s input
χhet = [1 + (1 − η) + 2νel]/η, where νel and η are
detector noise and detector efficiency, respectively.
We conduct numerical simulation using realistic pa-
rameters as summarized below: α = 0.2 dB/km, νel =
0.1, σφ = 0.04, η = 0.5, f = 0.95, and VA = 1. Fig.3
shows the simulation result in the asymptotic case. The
simulation result shows that the proposed LO phase re-
covery scheme can be applied to achieve efficient QKD.
Note that the secure key rate depicted in Fig. 9 are ob-
tained under the assumption of infinite number of pulses
sent from Alice to Bob. However, experimentally one
is always limited to a finite size data sample. To esti-
mate the effect of finite data on the secure key rate we
also conduct simulation using the most recent compos-
able security proof [34]. It can be shown (see Eq.(C13)
in supplemental materials of [34]) that the secure key rate
under the optimal collective attack is,
R = (1− rob)(βIAB − f(Σmaxa ,Σmaxb ,Σminc )
− 1
2n
[∆AEP −∆ent − 2 log2
1
2¯
]) (B12)
where IAB is the Shannon mutual information shared be-
tween Alice and Bob given in Eq.(B2); β is the efficiency
of the reconciliation algorithm; f is the upper bound of
the Holevo information χBE between Eve and Bob cal-
culated in supplemental materials of [34] (Eqs.(B2,C9-
C11)); rob is the protocol robustness parameter; ∆ent =
log2
1
 −
√
8n log22(4n) log2(1/) and ∆ent =
√
2n[(d +
1)2 + 4(d + 1) log2(2/
2
sm) + 2 log2(2/
2sm)] − 4smd/.
For our simulations, following [34], we choose protocol
parameters such that it is -secure against collective at-
tacks with  = 10−20 and cor-correct with cor ≤ 10−2
by setting sm = ¯ = 10
−21, PE = cor = ent = 10−41.
We also assume that the discretization parameter d = 5
i.e. each measurement result is placed in one of five
bins. Similarly to the asymptotic secure key rate sim-
ulations we set the physical parameters α = 0.2 dB/km,
σφ = 0.04, and VA = 1 and the reconciliation efficiency
β = 0.95. In Fig. 10 we plot the simulated secure key rate
as a function of the number of pulses transmitted for a
fixed fiber length L = 10 km assuming perfect detectors
( νel = 0, η = 1 ). The simulation results indicate that
a usable secure key can be generated by sending ≈ 1011
pulses which is achievable with a CV-QKD system oper-
ated at tens of MHz rate.
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